

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Transformation of Installation Management – The Key to Success of Army Transformation

by

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ABSTRACT

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Army Transformation cannot succeed if Transformation of Installation Management (TIM) is neglected. TIM must receive equal attention and emphasis as research and development, force structure and technology development. The historical neglect of sufficiently funding the Army Sustainment, Repair and Maintenance (SRM) requirements has had an unintended negative impact on soldier and family well-being. This neglect has resulted in lower morale and retention of soldiers and their families—the key component of the Army's success. Although the Army is making marginal changes by taking a more business-like approach to solving systematic problems, a more proactive and transformational approach must be taken to reverse this trend.

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TRANSFORMATION OF INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT – THE KEY TO SUCCESS OF ARMY TRANSFORMATION

The events of September 11, 2001 have forever changed the skyline of New York City and very likely the view that the United States has of the international community. The days of traveling freely from country to country and even from state to state in this previously unthreatened country will never be like it once was, worry-free. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and the subsequent downing of a third airliner in the rural country-side of Pennsylvania, have given the American people a lesson on foreign policy development and international relations. The American impression that “it can never happen here” is a thing of the past. If anything good can come out of this horrible tragedy, it is that these events have brought to light the fact that events around the world indeed impact the lives of Americans. If Americans were not aware of U.S. foreign policy formulation, their country’s stance on international issues, or how the instruments of the U.S. national power can be used to shape world opinion, then the events of September 11, 2001 are an expensive but albeit necessary lesson.

In order to address this country’s uncertain future and to provide the American people, as well as our nation’s allies and friends, with assurances that the U.S. Army is prepared to address threats of this nature in the future, the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) and the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) must directly address long-existing shortfalls. Army Transformation and its inherent combat and combat support systems will fail if Transformation of Installation Management (TIM) is neglected. The senior Army leadership must give equal attention to installation transformation, to include soldier and family well-being, as they have done with force structure, research and development, and technology development efforts for Army Transformation to succeed.

The leadership must focus the Army’s efforts in addressing two areas in particular to be successful. First, the poor state of installation infrastructure. The Fiscal Year (FY) 00 Installation Status Report, reflected a backlog of approximately \$18B in the Sustainment, Repair and Maintenance (SRM) account for Active,

Reserve and Federally Funded National Guard Installations. This must be addressed before any organization, let alone units which have a force projection mission requirement, can meet the National Military Strategy (NMS) objective of projecting forces anywhere in the world. The spreadsheet at Figure 1 reflects the FY00 ISR information (most recent data at time of publishing). The magnitude of the backlogged SRM account is reflective of the previous tendency by senior leaders to defer needed infrastructure repair and maintenance.

• Army is C-3 for facilities with some C-4					
		Annual	Annual	Annual	
		Improve	Improve	Improve	Improve
		to C-2	to C-2	to C-2	to C-1
MACOM	Total	over 10 Yrs	over 15 Yrs	over 20 Yrs	Total
TRADOC	1,325,081	132,508	88,339	66,254	2,517,926
USAREUR	1,285,667	128,567	85,711	64,283	2,472,773
FORSCOM	793,824	79,382	52,922	39,691	1,954,985
USARPAC	563,108	56,311	37,541	28,155	1,058,480
ATEC	499,617	49,962	33,308	24,981	812,746
AMC *	323,474	32,347	21,565	16,174	779,807
EUSA	351,352	35,135	23,423	17,568	590,668
USMA	275,554	27,555	18,370	13,778	403,243
MEDCOM**	162,193	16,219	10,813	8,110	260,332
USASMDC	144,555	14,456	9,637	7,228	235,202
MDW	108,714	10,871	7,248	5,436	223,370
USARSO	6,031	603	402	302	19,096
USACE	173	17	12	9	2,953
MTMC	246	25	16	12	789
AC Total	5,839,589	583,959	389,306	291,979	11,332,370
USAR	600,640	60,064	40,043	30,032	1,348,602
Fed Funded ARNG	3,098,238	309,824	206,549	154,912	5,160,912
Army Total	9,538,467	953,847	635,898	476,923	17,841,884

FIGURE 1 FY 00 ISR DATA

In many instances these decisions were made in favor of protecting required training events, often times under the extreme pressure of meeting specified readiness levels within reduced budgets. The Army has existing tools with which to focus these efforts, and to its credit continues to develop greater, more flexible tools which will assist senior Army leadership in their decision making process.

The Installation Status Report (ISR) and the Strategic Readiness System (SRS) will be discussed to shed light on how these two systems will assist in allowing installations to accomplish their designated missions. Both the ISR and SRS are tools designed to report the status of the conditions of installations and family programs. The SRS was designed to provide installation commanders with the flexibility to project anticipated requirements and is anticipated to be sufficiently adaptable to meet the Army's transformational goals. While the ISR and SRS identify requirements, it is resources applied to those requirements that will improve our installations.

The second major area of concern for the Army is the day-to-day management of quality of life programs for soldiers and their families. The Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study Report released in May, 2001 conducted a survey of over 13, 000 active duty and reserve officers across 61 installations. One of the findings is that:

"many officers reported that they don't mind working long hours, training all night, deploying and making sacrifices, as long as the Army lives up to its part of the bargain -- such as well-being for families and a fair shake at advancement." Additionally, "The Army's commitment to well-being, family and personal time, health care, housing, and retirement benefit expectations are not being fully met." 1

What is interesting to note is that the results of this report are strikingly similar to The Annual Report to the President and Congress, delivered by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry in March, 1996. Chapter 5, Quality of Life (QOL), specifically addressed the housing issue as well as other "nonpay" military benefits.

In this chapter, the Secretary specifically addressed the connection between QOL and retention.

There is a direct relationship among readiness, retention, and quality of life. To the extent that the Department encourages or directly provides quality housing for both unaccompanied and married service personnel, it will materially improve job performance and satisfaction, improve the retention of quality individuals, and through these means, sustain the high levels of force readiness needed to meet the Department's national security missions. The Army has an expression, "You enlist the individual, but you reenlist the family."

Many of the issues raised during this report were brought to light as a result of the establishment of the Quality of Life Task Force chaired by the former Secretary of the Army, John Marsh. This task force, in conjunction with Secretary Perry's establishment of the Quality of Life Executive Committee, began what was perhaps the most committed effort by the Department of the Defense's to address these deficiencies. These proactive efforts would eventually evolve into what today is the Army's most concerted effort to take care of Army families. This newest initiative, entitled Army Well-Being, will be examined in some detail. This area is perhaps the most crucial area in that it focuses on the centerpiece of the Army itself—people. We will examine the programs underway to meet the needs of Army families—an ever-growing and seemingly limitless demand for better services. Again, the Army has taken some steps to address this area by making improvements essential for ensuring soldiers continue serving their country and recruiting future generations of this Army's leaders.

Fortunately, both the installation infrastructure issue and many of the Well-Being issues come under the purview of a single directorate on the Army Staff. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Installation Management (ACSIM) has staff responsibility for both of these programs as well as a myriad of other functions. A closer look at the organizational structure of the ACSIM and in particular the newly formed Installation Management Agency (IMA) will focus this discussion on how the Army intends to address both these areas to meet its obligation to comply with the National Military

Strategy's goals and objectives set forth by the Department of Defense (DoD) and the National Security Strategy (NSS) which it supports. In order to understand how the Army fits into the scheme of meeting these national objectives, a closer look at the national directives is necessary.

WHY IS TRANSFORMATION OF INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT (TIM) IMPORTANT?

A close examination of the recently published Bush Administration's NSS and the previous Clinton strategy both identify national interests that impact on how the United States will develop options to protect itself from future asymmetric terrorist threats. Army Transformation and subsequently TIM, derive their essence from our national interests.

The National Security Strategy for a Global Age published in December 2000 provides the basis for the goals the Clinton administration had determined to be national interests, "Our national interests are wide-ranging. They cover those requirements essential to the survival and well-being of our Nation as well as the desire to see us, and others, abide by principles such as the rule of law, upon which our republic is founded." ²

The Clinton NSS continues by categorizing these national interests into three groups: vital, important and humanitarian. Among the vital interests specified in the strategy are:

the physical security of our territory and that of our allies, the safety of our citizens both at home and abroad, protection against WMD proliferation, the economic well-being of our society, and protection of our critical infrastructures..... . We will do what we must to defend these interests. This may involve the use of military force, including unilateral action, where deemed necessary or appropriate.³

An examination of the Bush administration's NSS, published in September 2002, one year after the terrorist attacks, addresses military transformation in strikingly similar terms. Although the Bush NSS does not specifically state national interests, it does allude to national interests and values as "political and economic

freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.”⁴ The “ways” of achieving these “ends” include, “transform[ing] America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.”⁵

To this end, the Bush NSS specifically advocates preemptive acts to forestall hostile acts by U.S. adversaries. To support these preemptive options, the NSS directs that the U.S. “will continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.”⁶

If we were to identify our national interests as those outlined above, then perhaps defeating terrorist organizations globally can be considered an “end” which advances these national interests. The “ways” by which we are to attain these ends then rest with what our nation has historically relied on as our sources of national power. Although our instruments of national power are recognized as diplomatic, economic, military and informational, the military instrument is often the most overt of these instruments and perhaps the one our national leaders prefer to use the least. Although diplomatic and economic efforts are underway to try to rid the world of terrorist activities, the military instrument of national power is the clearest signal our nation can send around the world to communicate our resolve. Given the events of 11 September 2001, and the increasingly unpredictable methods used by terrorists world-wide (as evidenced by new terrorist tactics in Israeli-Palestinian conflicts), the military instrument of power must show great versatility to deal with this new threat. The Clinton Administration addressed this need for flexibility.

We must prepare for an uncertain future, even as we address today’s security problems. We need to look at our national security apparatus to ensure its effectiveness by adapting its institutions to meet these challenges. This means we must transform our capabilities and organizations—diplomatic, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and economic—to act swiftly and to anticipate new opportunities and threats in today’s continually evolving, highly complex international security environment.⁷

What is important to note, however, is that the administration specifically addressed three areas in which the military’s transformation had to strike a balance

in funding priorities. “Maintaining the ability of our forces to shape and respond today; modernizing to protect for the long term readiness of the force; and exploiting the revolution in military affairs to ensure we maintain unparalleled capabilities to shape and respond effectively in the future.”⁸

Implicit in the intent of the transformation of our national security institutions is the need to transform not only how the military is organized, but also its role in the newly established homeland security mission. Although the final decision on the military’s role in Homeland Security is still under review, the clear indication is that National Guard (NG) and Reserve (USAR) component units will play a significant role in at least the force protection role. Given that the majority of “special skilled” units are in the USAR and NG, it is reasonable to assume that these units will participate in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) mitigation missions. More than 70% of U.S. Chemical companies and the only U.S. Army Chemical Brigade reside in the reserve component. So why is TIM important to homeland security? Regardless of where these units are located, either in the active or reserve component, the infrastructure supporting rapid deployment of these units is equally inadequate.

Centered on a new Department of Homeland Security and including a new unified military command and a fundamental reordering of the FBI, our comprehensive plan to secure the homeland encompasses every level of government and the cooperation of the public and private sector.⁹

This is a sweeping change from the role that the military has had previously in regard to assisting in domestic issues. Previous domestic assistance involved, in large part, the mobilization of reserve component forces for natural disasters. The potential now exists for direct intervention on domestic soil across state lines, which would involve federally mobilizing military forces. Infrastructure decline will negatively affect domestic readiness response. This is particularly concerning given the likelihood that military forces will be used for mitigation of consequences following a terrorist use of WMD. Consequence management is specifically included in the NSS.

We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use WMD against the United States and our allies and friends....The United States must be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against our forces abroad, and to help friends and allies if they are attacked.¹⁰

This implied task means that the U.S. military must be capable of deploying forces both internal to the Continental United States (CONUS) and Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) in the event of a WMD attack. To this end, the Bush NSS specifically advocates preemptive acts to forestall hostile acts by U.S. adversaries. To support these preemptive options, the NSS directs that the U.S. “will continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.”¹¹

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report of September 30, 2001 specified six critical operational goals (strategic tenets) that the SECDEF wished to accomplish. Among the six strategic tenets identified, projecting power and providing for the security of the homeland are specifically addressed. “Defending the United States and Projecting U.S. Military Power—defending the homeland against possible external attacks as well as enhancing the U.S. military’s capability to project forces at long ranges.”¹²

To review, the NSS, the NMS and the QDR specifically have identified the requirement for the capability of our forces to be able to quickly react to asymmetric threats in the future. This capability to rapidly deploy forces both abroad and at home is crucial in securing our national interests. Inherent in providing this capability to power project forces assumes that installations are adequately manned, trained and equipped to do so.

WHAT DOES THE ARMY NEED TO DO ABOUT IT?

The Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) has made some significant strides in addressing the known shortfalls that would hamper projecting forces at home and abroad. It has also taken some important steps forward in


addressing the needs of soldiers and their families. But are these steps truly transformational? In two respects I believe they are transformational. Under the direction of the SECDEF, the Army has streamlined and flattened organizationally. In business theory, this reorganization would result in fewer hurdles managers would have to negotiate to reach their desired end-states. Additionally, guidance and feedback flowing from both managers and action officers would be more clearly articulated and understood. Secondly, I believe that the recent emphasis on strategic planning at the installation level is key to success and is to date unprecedented. Strategic planning has for the most part been the responsibility of higher-level organizations in the Army which have had the time and staffing to accomplish the detailed planning needed. By requiring installations to plan for the out-years, the Army will ensure that subordinate units' strategic goals and objectives are properly aligned with their higher headquarters' goals and objectives. This will ensure that the organization as a whole is progressing in the direction desired by the senior leadership. The culmination of installation strategic planning will come to fruition when this planning can be tied to senior leader resource allocation decisions. Strategic planning at the installation level is simply a drill unless resources are allocated in sufficient amounts to achieve desired goals and objectives. Although the Army cannot operate as many large corporations can in the private sector, largely because of external influences such as Congressional oversight, it can incorporate many of the private sector managerial tools necessary for success.

THE TRANSFORMED ORGANIZATION AND ITS PROGRAMS.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Installation Management is organized as shown in figure 2 below.



Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management



Last Update: 13 November 2002

FIGURE 2 OACSIM ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

Under this organizational structure, the ACSIM has the responsibility, authority and oversight of both functions central to the success of TIM, which are Installation Management and Army Well-Being in the aspect of areas affiliated with the Community and Family Support Center. The first issue of inadequate installation infrastructure can be addressed by examining the newly formed Installation Management Agency (IMA). The IMA and its subordinate elements were officially formed 1 October, 2002. The IMA mission, vision and goals are:

Mission: Provide equitable, efficient and effective management of Army installations worldwide to support mission readiness and execution, enable well-being of soldiers, civilians and their family members, improve infrastructure and preserve the environment.

Vision: The pre-eminent Department of Defense agency that produces highly effective, state-of-the-art installations worldwide, maximizing support to People, Readiness, and Transformation.

Goals: 1) **Manage installations equitably, effectively and efficiently;** 2) **Enable the well-being of the Army's people;** 3) Provide sound stewardship of resources; 4) Deliver superior mission support to all organizations; and 5) Develop and sustain an innovative, team-spirited, highly capable, service-oriented workforce—a vital component of the Army Team.¹³

An understanding of the underpinning for the establishment of the IMA is necessary before we go further. For as long as most professional soldiers can remember, the bulk of HQDA Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) funding was devoted to ensuring that our war-fighting machinery was prepared to do battle and win our nation's wars. That often entailed ensuring that vehicles were operationally ready, that sufficient ammunition was available to qualify on specific fighting platforms and that training facilities were made available for maneuver units whenever they were needed. One can not argue with the rationale used. The consequence of our enthusiastic support of this approach was that all other necessary functions fell victim to accomplishing this "mission". Since monetary resources were allocated to MACOM Commanders, it was their command prerogative to place those resources where they felt it was best used. The result was that both infrastructure and mission dollars came from the same pot of money. Infrastructure began to deteriorate, family housing became victim to bullets, barracks in which our soldiers lived suffered, family programs began to fail, and the services those soldiers and their dependents needed were no longer available. Major General Milton Hunter, the Deputy Chief of Engineers and Deputy Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers highlighted his concerns in his September 2001 article in Army Magazine by saying, "While we have developed the best trained and maintained Army in the world, we have managed to station our soldiers and units in second-class and third-class installations."¹⁴ The Army has made great strides in the last ten years to address the known shortcoming by using the Army Strategic Mobility Program to upgrade key installations to conduct deployments from the CONUS, as well as upgrading some of the barracks at these installations. These efforts, however, have done little to address the continued

under-funding of repair and maintenance programs for installations. General Hunter states:

"We continue to under-fund the necessary maintenance and repair of our aging real property inventory by as much as 70 percent. Our installations are very much on the verge of catastrophic failure because we have failed to fund their continued sustainment through a viable Army-wide installation maintenance system." 15

The Army has attempted to address this significant issue by formulating a centralized management system to create a firewall between mission funds and installation funds. As discussed previously, the continued migration of BASOPS dollars into mission accounts has resulted in both DoD and Congressional involvement. This involvement stemmed largely from Congressional testimony by General Hugh Shelton and the service Chiefs of Staff on 27 October, 1999. Their testimony included the following statements:

America's first-to-fight forces remain capable of executing national military strategy, including the ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, Shelton said. But because of readiness concerns, military officials assess the risk factors for fighting and winning the first major war as moderate, and for the second as high. This does not mean that U.S. forces would not prevail in either contingency," he said. "What it does mean is that it will take longer to respond to hostilities, which in turn means territory lost and an increased potential for casualties." 16

The Army's dilemma of facing two Major Regional Contingencies while also deploying forces on various other missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and disaster assistance without supplemental funding, resulted in the only option mission commanders had available. The diversion of available funds from BASOPS accounts to mission accounts was the least risky alternative. This decision only exacerbated an already delicate balance—war-fighting versus installation support. In an effort to curtail fund migration from BASOPS to mission dollars, Congress made concerted efforts to increase defense budgets to address ongoing concerns about the frequency of military deployments on peacekeeping missions. In addition, the Secretary of the Army directed that an organization dedicated to the

management of installation be formed. The Installation Management Agency (IMA) was activated on 1 October 2001.

The intent and purpose of the IMA is to streamline headquarters, create more agile and responsive staffs, reduce layers of review and approval, focus on mission, and transform the Army. The IMA brings together all installation support services under one umbrella to promote optimal care and support of soldiers and families. As a field operating agency under the (ACSIM), IMA is at the center of the Army's initiative to mold installation support functions into a corporate structure, enabling equitable, efficient and effective management of Army installations worldwide. The IMA will support readiness, promote well-being of soldiers, civilians and family members, and preserve infrastructure and environment. The Agency will oversee all Army-wide installation management, including environmental programs, construction, morale and welfare, family care, force protection landscaping, logistics, public works, etc., and the planning, programming and budget that resource these functions. The IMA structure enables the Army to establish standards, resource to standard, and deliver equitable services from installation to installation.¹⁷ The Headquarters, IMA and its seven IMA Regions are shown in Figure 3.




FIGURE 3 IMA REGIONAL MAP

Effective 1 October 2002, IMA Headquarters, in Arlington, VA, was formally activated along with its seven regional offices, four in the continental U.S. and three overseas. In FY 04, IMA Headquarters will begin to fund garrisons directly and garrison organizations will be moved under the IMA organizational document. The goal is to have completed the redesign of IMA business processes by FY 05, at which time regions will be staffed with end-state authorizations.¹⁸ The relationship between installation management, the National Military Strategy and the Army Vision are viewed as critical to successfully achieving our national interests. The lowest common denominator of successfully deploying forces from CONUS is our military installations. MG Aadland, Director, U.S. Army IMA expressed this relationship upon assumption of his duties.

U.S. Army Installations are much more than bundled real estate and a collection of utilities infrastructure. Like any US city, installations live and breathe. They are the home and workplace of our Army soldiers, civilians and their families. They are special places where families are raised and from which peacetime missions are executed, force sustainment originates, and wartime readiness is realized. Installations provide the underpinnings that support National Military Strategy and future conceptualizations of Army Vision. The Installation Management Agency brings together all installation management functions to support the mission readiness of our fighting forces, provide for the well-being of our soldiers, civilians and family members, improve aging infrastructure and preserve the environment.¹⁹

To help provide clarification of the level of service that installation "customers" can expect, the OACSIM, in conjunction with Army staff proponents, have revised the Army Baseline Services (ABS) in November 2002. The ABS prescribes the 95 essential base support services that installations provide to Army customers, and defines service levels provided on a non-reimbursable basis. A breakout of the functions and services that installations provide is at Figure 3. Figure 3 depicts 9 major service areas (color coded) with 38 corresponding functions per service area. A total of 95 services are aligned with these functions. Customers who require services above and beyond those stipulated within the ABS, will incur additional charges for those services. This endeavor to establish baseline standards will

significantly enhance installations commanders' ability to properly budget for needed services as well as conduct long-term planning.




FIGURE 4 ARMY BASELINE SERVICES

In FY 04, when funding comes directly from IMA Headquarters, the installation commanders' loyalty to the local mission commanders' requirements may be in conflict with the regional headquarters' interests. The installation commanders' primary mission is to support the senior mission commander in successfully accomplishing his war-fighting mission. The installation commander also has the responsibility to provide the same level of support to other tenant unit organizations on the installation. Under budgetary constraints, the installation commander will be called upon to decide where these limited resources are applied. Given current guidance, installation commanders will be rated by their respective Regional Directors and senior rated the senior mission commander. This situation exacerbates itself given the proximity of the local mission commander compared to the more distant Regional Director, both vying for efficient use of scarce resources.

The decision to apply resources judiciously to provide acceptable services for all tenant organizations may at times be in conflict with the senior mission commanders' desires to support his training requirements. This will require installation commanders to carefully balance commitments to their senior raters with the requirements from other organizations.

WHAT IS THE MEASURE OF SUCCESS?

If the sweeping organizational change of installation management is accomplished, and the funding lines are clearly defined, then what is the measure of success in determining that the Army is addressing the critical infrastructure problems? The Installation Status Report (ISR) was designed after the maneuver units' Unit Status Report (USR) with the exception that the ISR is submitted annually. This annual analysis may in fact be the cause of its ineffectiveness, which will be described as part of recommendations for improvement. The ISR was developed by HQDA in 1994 as a way to assess installation level conditions and performance against Army-wide standards. Data is compiled annually from all Army installations. This data is then used to develop a three-part report. The ISR uses familiar "C" ratings used to convey the "quality or quantity" of given facilities or services based on previously established standards.

In an effort to reduce workload on limited installation staffs and to take advantage of information technology, the Army has developed the ISR so that it would essentially rely on information readily available in various databases currently in existence. The ISR integrates many currently available institutional databases which reduces redundant reporting requirement for installations. These data bases include: 1) The Integrated Facility System (IFS), which is the Army's database for Real Property and captures the installations' "on-hand" assets; 2) The Army Stationing Installation Plan (ASIP) captures authorized force structure by installation over the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) years at the unit level of detail; 3) Real Property Planning and Analysis System (RPLANS) determines installation facility requirements based on the Army Stationing Installation Plan (ASIP)

population, space planning criteria and on-hand assets; 4) The Environmental Program Requirements Report (EPR), Environmental Quality Report (EQR), and Defense Sites Environmental Restoration Tracking System/Cost to Complete (DSERTS/CTC) feed directly into ISR Environmental portion of the ISR and; 5) Service Based Costing (SBC) captures the cost of performing a service on an installation. ISR Services will capture the condition of that service. Standard Service Costing (SSC), currently under development, will capture the SBC and ISR Services data and make a comparison of what services “actually” cost against what services “should” cost.

The first part of the ISR measures “Infrastructure”, facility quality and quantity at various installations based on established U.S. Army Corps of Engineers standards. These standards are adequate for current installation footprints, but do not provide sufficient flexibility to plan for future needs. If stationing decisions put future maneuver units at particular installations, then those same installations need to be able to predict what their future support requirements will be. The second part of the ISR entitled “Environment” does an excellent job of identifying and monitoring efforts to restore secure and protect the surrounding environment of individual installations. Again, if the installation is transforming, then a more robust capability to predict environmental impacts may be needed. Thirdly, the ISR is designed to establish minimal service standards for all installations. Quantifying the “Services” portion of the ISR has proven to be a daunting task and those standards are currently under formulation as previously discussed.

In addition to the ISR, the CSA has recently given guidance to establish a comparable Strategic Readiness System (SRS) that would prove to be a more predictive model. This would allow installation commanders to more adequately predict their future requirements given the complexity and speed by which Army Transformation is moving. The SRS is intended to be an integrated strategic management and measurement system that will ensure that all Army organizations align their unit’s operations to the vision, objectives and initiatives in The Army Plan (TAP). The Army Plan was created to integrate and provide planning guidance for

developing the Army's Program Objective Memorandum. The TAP is focused on a seamless integration with National and Joint planning guidance; identifying essential capabilities and related requirements that enable the Army to be responsive to assigned missions. TAP consists of three sections: Section I on strategic direction; Section II on capability-based planning guidance; and Section III on programmatic guidance. Planners now have a detailed database containing prioritized capabilities, which relate to Management Decision Packages - providing a linkage between Planning and Programming. Most importantly, however, is that the SRS is intended to measure each organization's success in achieving these goals. Like the ISR, the SRS is intended to use already existing databases which would preclude organizations from redundant reporting. The SRS would allow units at the Brigade and Division levels to monitor how their organizations are progressing in meeting the overall vision of TAP. It will also allow organizational leadership to see resource and readiness links and provide predictive modeling capability to improve the leaders' ability to allocate resources to achieve to the highest degree of readiness. This predictive capability is a critical part of the installation commanders' assessment of successfully supporting war-fighting units' deployments from their installations. Of particular importance would be the ability to anticipate future power-projection requirements for installations. This is extremely valuable given the need for installations to be more involved in long-term strategic planning as mentioned earlier. The SRS will be a tool that allows the Army's senior leadership to manage and assess the readiness of the transformed force by using existing readiness data and linking them to the overall strategy of TAP. SRS is currently being fielded. The SRS is the only tool that installation commanders will have available to "project" future requirements based on current funding and resource constraints.

The SRS enables commanders to develop long-term strategies which, in turn, formulate clearly identified requirements. Solutions to these requirements can be formulated which ultimately identify the resources needed to meet the goals and objectives of the overall strategy.

HOW CAN IT BETTER BE USED?

First, both the ISR and the SRS are extremely dependent upon maintaining numerous databases that are tedious and manpower intensive. The training of personnel who are responsible for inputting data into these systems has been marginal at best. Many times command emphasis on accurate data collection is crucial to success. To be truly transformational these systems need to be network based with as little manpower involvement as possible. Additionally, the frequency at which the senior Army leadership reviews these reports must be increased. The pace at which the security environment changes is so frequent that the information provided may very well be obsolete when finally reviewed. In its current state, the CSA or his designated representative, reviews ISR data annually. This annual review is not sufficient to make substantive adjustments to Army programs to benefit the organization. The ISR system must be made more interactive as to provide senior leaders the ability to adjust programs in near real-time as to make appropriate adjustments in a timely manner. Semi-annual reviews of this data with appropriate resource allocation decisions would allow sufficient flexibility to address emerging issues.

Secondly, in addition to these technology based reporting systems; the Army must conduct a thorough review of its quality management program. As I previously mentioned, the Army cannot always function and operate as large corporations do in the civilian sector. However, true measurement of success in any organization can be determined by how well it meets the expectations of its customers, both internal and external to the organization. In the case of the Army, its internal customers are soldiers, civilians and their family members. Congress and American public are its external customers. The Army must fully support the Army Performance Improvement Criteria (APIC) Program. In an ongoing effort to improve the business practices of the Army, a highly recognized set of criterion has been used. Most major business enterprises around the world recognize the Malcolm Baldrige business criteria as the benchmark of excellence. The Army has adopted this criterion in its APIC program to provide a qualitative measurement of services

provided to its customers. Although there are many supporters of this quality improvement program, there are many more who simply view this program as another Total Quality Management (TQM) requirement which failed to yield either quantitative or qualitative changes for the Army in previous attempts. These failed attempts were attributable to a lack of understanding of the program by commanders as much as it was an ad hoc program put in place to stem the tide of inquiries from the Army's external customers.

In its most basic form, APIC is a measure of satisfaction that soldiers have in the quality of services the Army is providing them and their dependents. It is a system designed to provide feedback to management so that organizations can in turn adjust those services to better satisfy their customers. It is the quintessential "double and triple loop learning" model that provides continuous input and feedback from outside agencies that impact on the organizations bottom-line. But more importantly, it is a means by which soldiers and their families speak out and tell the Army leadership what they like and don't like about the Army's support structure. It is also an opportunity to provide feedback to our internal customers. Expectation management is critical given the Army will never be financially capable of meeting all the needs of its people. These internal customers can play a significant role in assisting commanders in determining the prioritization of scarce resources. Failure to put the appropriate emphasis on the results of this program is essentially telling soldiers that the Army leadership simply doesn't care about what are most valuable assets are saying. And in the long-term, if we fail to listen to our most valuable customers, then there is essentially no credence given to this statement made by the Secretary of Defense.

If we're to win the war on terror and prepare for tomorrow, we have to take proper care of the department's greatest assets, which are the men and women in uniform. They joined because they love their country and they believe freedom's worth defending. But at the same time we have to realize that they have families to support and children to educate.²⁰

THE HUMAN DIMENSION

The second area critical to the success of transformation is its people. Unlike many other organizations which may rely heavily on automation or machinery, the Army cannot function without its most important asset—people. Key to the retention and recruitment of this most valuable asset are the Army's Quality of Life programs. In this age of limited resources and ever-demanding needs of its people, the Army must make great strides in addressing the day-to-day needs of its key assets. On one hand, the Army must provide adequate incentives to retain highly qualified soldiers and their families as well as recruit future leaders. On the other hand, it must also closely manage expectations. The Army, like all organizations with limited resources cannot provide everything that its people want. It must therefore very carefully determine those things that are most important to its people and strive to meet those expectations within reason. To address this significant issue, the Army is in the process of aligning Well-Being functions across proponent staffs. Currently, the Army G-1 is responsible for the Well-Being Strategic Plan and its complimentary campaign plan. The Community and Family Support Center (CFSC), organizationally aligned under the ACSIM, is responsible for many of the day-to-day Well-Being functions. The Army G-1's efforts are designed to implement a method to synchronize and integrate existing and emerging plans and programs using a holistic approach. The Army Well-Being Strategic Plan and Campaign plan are designed to provide the senior leadership with information across all Army Well-Being programs from which they can make well informed and timely decisions. The Well-Being Strategic Plan depicted in figure 5 defines the linkage between Army Transformation and soldier, civilian and family Well-Being.




FIGURE 5 ARMY WELL-BEING CAMPAIGN

The Army is undergoing a significant transformation, a transformation that will affect its most fundamental nature. The philosophical framework laid out in this document depicts the “Institutional Strength of The Army” as Army Well-Being resting on a solid foundation - a foundation which is the very “fundamental” nature of our institution. The current Army transformation initiative will alter that foundation; the Army Well-Being initiative will alter the remaining components of the Institutional Strength of The Army.²¹

This may very well be the lynch-pin to ensuring that Army Transformation is truly successful. If Well-Being is a personal state and it differs from person to person (soldier, civilian and family member), then the Army must focus on this fundamental entity. In other words, the Army must find the least common denominator in these three entities and attempt to meet the minimal expectations of this population in order to be successful. The Army must also be extremely careful in managing the expectations of this population without alienating those which it must rely on to accomplish its missions.

The Army Well-Being Strategic Plan identifies the state of well-being as having four basic dimensions of life experience. If the Army was to adequately address the minimal standards of these four basic dimensions, then in turn, the well-being needs of the Army will be met, at least minimally. These dimensions are depicted in the figure 6 below.


The physical aspect pertains to satisfying one's physical needs through a healthy lifestyle. The materiel centers on needs such as shelter, food and financial resources. The mental aspect centers on the need to learn, grow achieve and be accepted. Finally, the spiritual need addresses one's religious and philosophical requirements are considered to influence things such as values and morals.²² As was indicated earlier, the Army is not responsible for prescribing these personal states for individuals however, "...The Army is responsible for creating and sustaining a climate, and providing access to a defined standard, which contributes positively to their lives, based on the tenets of Army values. The well-being of The Army is inextricably linked to the well-being of our soldiers, our civilians and their families."²³



FIGURE 6 ARMY WELL BEING

AZIMUTH CHECK ON THE ROAD TO TRANSFORMATION.

The Well-Being Status Report (WBSR) currently under development is intended to establish an objective means by which to measure the impact of Well-Being programs on performance, readiness, retention and recruiting and provide feedback for future adjustments. Figure 5 depicts the WBSR concept. This concept complements the Army Transformation in that it objectively assesses the human dimension of transformation and allows for necessary adjustments during period of significant change. The WBSR will be an annual report to the already programmed GOSCs. The WBSR will be linked to applicable standards—previously discussed in the ISR section of this paper, as well as the SRS currently under development. Metrics to assess accomplishment of Well-Being standards will include a variety of existing sources such as the Sample Survey of Military Personnel (SSMP), Sample Survey of Military Families (SSMF), and the Sample Survey of Civilian Personnel (SSCP).



The WBSR measures the impact and provides feedback.

FIGURE 7 WBSR

COMMUNICATION—THE KEY TO TRANSFORMATION SUCCESS.

As discussed previously, the Army has made some significant strides in addressing concerns in each of the dimensions. However, I'd like to focus on the mechanism that perhaps is most important in determining what the Army should focus on and what the Army's "customers" should expect. Communication is an extremely important aspect of both customer satisfaction and well-being. A dialogue between customers and senior leaders is essential. Leaders must engage in considerable expectation management to convey that resources are not unlimited and that all the desires of soldiers and their families cannot be met by the Army.

Addressing internal customers concerns

Communities must be involved in prioritization of efforts and in determination of program goals and objectives. Communication at the local level is easily accomplished through the use of community "town hall" meetings, Family Readiness Groups (FRG), active community news letters and the use of installation Army Community Service (ACS) facilities and programs. Communities that are actively involved in determining their strategic goals and objectives are more closely integrated and affiliated with the outcome. They are also involved in shaping their own future. Simple questions as, "What do you want in your community that you now do not have?" and, "What things are you willing to give up to get these things?"

places the reality and budgetary considerations of zero sum gains directly in front of customers. They then become active participants in the enterprise of improving morale and satisfaction.

Communicating with the external customer

As discussed earlier, internal communications can be executed in a variety of ways, but one of the most effective external means of communicating internal customers' concerns is through the Army Family Action Plan (AFAP) program. Instituted over seventeen years ago by Army spouses, AFAP is a means by which grass-roots issues concerning soldiers, civilians and their families can be raised to most senior levels of the Army and DoD. Installations and local levels hold AFAP forums - active and Reserve soldiers, retirees, surviving spouses, DA civilians, family members, and tenant organizations identify issues they believe are important to maintain a good standard of living. Local commanders are expected to work their issues toward resolution -- about 90% of AFAP issues are retained and worked at local level, resulting in ongoing community improvements. Some issues are applicable beyond the local level - these are sent to MACOM AFAP conferences and to HQDA, where delegates from across the Army determine which will go into the AFAP. These issues are worked toward resolution by Army staff and Department of Defense (DoD) agencies. A board of key DoD and Army staff general officer and senior executive service representatives lends the "teeth" to the AFAP process. This board, the AFAP General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC), reviews the progress of AFAP issues on a semiannual basis. The AFAP GOSC is the final deciding authority on the status of all issues (determining if an issue is completed [resolved]), unattainable, or needs to remain active until the issue's stated objectives have been met.²⁴

Of the over 500 issues raised through the AFAP process many have resulted in significant changes in legislation, policies, programs and services which have strengthened retention and readiness. A few success stories include increasing Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance (SGLI), increases in Basic Allowance for

Housing (BAH), establishment of the Family Support Group program, Army Family Team Building (AFTB) and Better Opportunity for Single Service members'(BOSS).

The key to success of the AFAP program is the continued participation of community members and the persistent pursuit of issue resolution at the local level. Local installation and tenant commanders cannot allow the local AFAP forum to become a “requirement” driven activity and undermine the objectives of the program. If the Army is to keep retention efforts successful and recruitment high then this already successful program is essential to meeting the intent of Army Transformation.

A word of caution is encouraged in discussing the AFAP program. Just by its shear magnitude, only a small number of identified issues are actually presented and addressed during the AFAP process. Just as in managing expectations, commanders must actively monitor issues raised at local installation levels which do not get elevated to MACOM or Army level. Issues which do not get acted upon at Army level must continue to be addressed at the installation, IMA and MACOM level as not to lose the support of the local community.

The Army Well-Being Campaign Plan addresses the need for both internal and external communications. Educating internal audiences on program capabilities and limitations as well as communicating accomplishments being made will positively impact retention and readiness. As important is the need for the Army to communicate to key audiences that it recognizes well-being shortfalls and has a plan to address them. Perhaps the most important objective in the communications program is the need to articulate well-being program requirements to external audiences that can influence the funding shortfalls of these programs for future resourcing decisions. Effective communications with visiting congressional delegations to local installations can provide important support. Additionally, communicating with state Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army (CASA) can help raise internal customer concerns.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Army senior leadership must be committed to fund SRM at 100% to affect the downward spiral of infrastructure deterioration. To do anything less will result in continued escalation of the already unmanageable SRM backlog. The positive funding progress made in the recent past (funding at 93% in FY 04) will not go far enough to catch up with this tremendous backlog.

The formation of the IMA is positive step to ensuring that resources go to installations. Installations should not be seen as the bill payers for war-fighting, but rather an integral component of readiness. The migration of BASOPS funds to mission accounts will very likely continue in the future, particularly in the short term, due to the requirements of the War on Terrorism and Homeland Security. The significant difference in the process, however, is that the transfer will occur at the HQDA. The Army senior leadership must continue to monitor and avoid future migration of BASOPS funds to mission accounts and its impact on installation preparedness. Additionally, manpower allocations must be made to fully support the installation garrison organizations. Personnel strength must reach 100% and remain there for the IMA and its installations to work as expected.

Senior Army leadership must ensure that the SRS, ISR and WBSR programs obtain the resources necessary to ensure that they become fully automated and integrated. Additionally, the frequency with which the senior Army leadership reviews these reports must be increased. In an era of rapid change and high tempo of operations, an annual review of this data is not sufficient to make substantive adjustments to Army programs. A semi-annual review of this data with appropriate resource allocation decisions would allow sufficient flexibility to address emerging trends and issues.

In order to accomplish any of the actions mentioned above, communications to internal and external customers is essential. The Army must ensure that the programs already established (AFAP, FRGs, APIC) continue to receive funding at appropriate levels to remain viable. In particular the Army must ensure that

concerns raised at the installations receive the level of attention necessary to keep community members involved in long-term strategic planning. Installation commanders must ensure that appropriate feedback is being provided to their internal customers regarding the status of their issues. Community involvement on grass root issues will result in continued retention and recruitment successes. These recommendations do not require considerable expenditure of resources. Rather they suggest reemphasis on synchronizing existing or newly formulated programs that would enhance the CSA's efforts in meeting the Army's strategic objectives.

CONCLUSIONS

Army Transformation cannot succeed if Transformation of Installation Management is neglected. The historical neglect of installation resourcing has resulted in an almost insurmountable backlog OF SRM, almost \$18 B to date. The effectiveness of the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) and the Objective Forces' Future Combat System (FCS) will be severely hampered in accomplishing its desired end-state unless installations of the future have the inherent ability to project forces to their destined locations. Concomitantly, installations must have sufficient resources in terms of personnel and funding to adequately meet the demands of its customers.

TIM and the formation of the IMA are methods to ensure that resources get to the installation level rather than being diverted by MACOMs to augment mission requirements. The SRS, ISR and the WBSR are valuable tools which will allow installation commanders to report current and projected installation readiness as compared to established standards. These systems, once fully integrated, will provide the senior leadership of the Army with near-real time information on which resourcing decisions can be made.

In doing so, a closer relationship between leaders and community members must be established in order to properly address the greatest concerns of the Army family. Internal and external customer communications is key to fostering this relationship both in terms of consideration of the needs of the community as well as

in terms of expectation management. Current Army programs such as AFAP, FRGs and ACS channels are sufficiently mature to allow the Army leadership to enhance this communication.

“The Army is People”, it’s the theme we are all familiar with. The impetus that the CSA has imparted to ensure irreversible change is to be complemented. To ensure that his vision for this nation’s Army is realized, it is incumbent upon the senior leaders to implement the programs necessary to fully realize the magnitude of these efforts. Transforming the Army is inextricably linked to the infrastructure of its installations and the Well-Being of its people. The vast efforts undertaken to reorganize installation management and to harness the myriad of quality of life programs into a comprehensive decision-making mechanism are impressive. Continued fiscal support, continued scrutiny at the most senior levels of leadership, and continued willingness to take risk in the face of rapid change will be the hallmark of ensuring that the Army continues on the successful path of transformation. Without this crucial support and scrutiny from the most senior levels of the Army, installation management and its inherent programs will revert to their previous unsatisfactory state and will in turn put Army Transformation at risk.

WORD COUNT=8,692

ENDNOTES

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³ Ibid.

⁴ George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 1.

⁵ Ibid., 2.

⁶ Ibid., 16.

⁷ Ibid., 29.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., 6.

¹⁰ Ibid., 14.

¹¹ Ibid., 16.

¹² Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C. U.S. Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), 14.

¹³ Larry J. Lust, "Garrison Commanders Notes, No. 48." November 2002; available from <http://www.hqda.army.mil/acsimweb/doc/GCNoteNo.48-ov02.doc>; Internet; accessed 6 November 2002.

¹⁴ Milton Hunter, "Installation Management: A Key Component of Readiness." Army 51 (September 2001): 58.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Linda D. Kozaryn, "Shelton, Chiefs to SASC: Optempo, Limited Funds Erode Readiness", American Forces Press Service, (27 October 1999).

¹⁷ Rudolph Burwell, "U.S. Army Installation Management Agency Activated", U.S. Army News Release, (1 October, 2001).

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¹⁹ Anders B. Aadland, "Director's Welcome." Available from <<http://www.ima.army.mil/dirwelcome.asp>>; Internet; accessed 16 November 2002.

²⁰ Armed Forces Press Services, May 02

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²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Army Family Action Plan, "Frequently Asked Questions." Available from http://www.armycommunityservice.org/vacs_afap; Internet: accessed 2 December 2002.

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